Within the Museum archives is a copy of a typescript written by Lt Cdr Bevil Warington Smyth. He became head of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) base in December 1942 and continued there until the end of the war. His father, Herbert, a former Naval Officer, had retired to a house called Calamansac on the Helford and lived there until his death in 1943.
Short History of SOE Naval Base at Helford River
Winter 1940/Summer 1941
In the winter of 1940, it was decided to set up a small base in the West Country with a view to attempting to organize a line of sea communication with Brittany.
Lt GA Holdsworth RNVR, who had previously worked for SOE in NW Europe, was entrusted with the task of obtaining the necessary ships, recruiting personnel and selecting a suitable base of operations. Temporary headquarters were first established in a house at Helford River, overlooking the anchorage.
Broadly, the main intention was to use French fishing craft, manned by picked crews including Breton pilots and fishermen, to contact the Breton fishing fleets working on the Banks off the NW coast of Brittany with a view to obtaining information and eventually landing stores and arms to the resistance groups.
Representative types of French fishing craft, eg a Tunnyman, a Longliner and a motor Trawler, were accordingly requisitioned and – after certain necessary alterations had been made to their accommodation – the vessels were commissioned and the work of training crews was begun.
Winter 1941/1942
The North Coast of Brittany, owing to the shorter sea passages involved, offered obvious advantages as compared with the West Coast for direct landings, (at any rate in the early stages of the Enemy occupation), but the use of fishing vessels for clandestine operations on the North Coast was precluded owing to the fact that the enemy issued regulations confining all sea-going fishing vessels to the south of the Latitude of Ushant; the only fishing allowed on the North Coast being inshore fishing carried on by small open boats.
It was therefore necessary to employ for North Coast work a vessel fast enough to be able to cross the Channel, carry out an operation and return to base in one night under cover of darkness. The acquisition of a suitable vessel, however, proved a matter of immense difficulty as the Navy were unwilling to provide such a craft, but finally a 41’6” RAF seaplane tender was generously provided by the Air Force. This vessel was really both too small and too slow for the work required of her. While handy for quick manoeuvring in rock strewn waters, her small size was a handicap in that it allowed no room on deck for a rigid boat, and the control cabin forward lacked space for reasonable navigational facilities. Her top speed in smooth water was a bare 20 knots and, when laden down with additional fuel and stores for an operation. Her cruising speed under the most favourable weather conditions was no better than 15 knots. This meant, of course, that she could not operate during the short summer nights. Bearing these drawbacks in mind, it speaks volumes for the keenness, enthusiasm and skill of Holdsworth and his Officers and Men that they carried out four successful operations in this boat during midwinter 1941/42. Three of these operations were infiltrating agents and stores to the L’Abervrac’h area and the fourth was a “Lobster Pot” operation to the Ile de Bas neighbourhood. In view of the subsequent difficulties over weather with much larger craft, it is worthy of record that two of these operations were carried out in one week at the end of December.
During this period, the fishing vessels were being “worked up” with a view to getting them ready to carry out the original scheme of contacting the Breton west coast fishing fleets working the offshore banks on the Continental shelf in the coming spring and summer. Several full scale exercises were carried out in neighbourhood of the Scillies – one of the uninhabited Eastern islands being used as an advanced base for the repainting and camouflaging of the ships.
Meanwhile NID(C),1 who had established a base at Dartmouth, were operations a sea mail and transport service for SIS,2 by MGBs3 to the North Coast of Brittany and by fishing vessel to the West Coast. The fishing vessels in use at this time were a 45 ft “Pinasse” and a 65 ft “Malamok”, and these two ships between them maintained a regular mail service to the West Coast with a considerable degree of success. Air cover for these operations, as well as for the North Coast gunboat operations, was organised by the Naval Operations Liaison Officer, Lt Cdr WB Luard RN, whose Headquarters were at the RAF aerodrome at St.Eval.
Early 1942
In January 1942, a directive was issued placing SOE vessels at Helford under the operational control of NID(C). This step was apparently considered necessary to avoid possible overlapping and clashing of operational interests, and in principle this co-ordination under a single operational control must be adjudged a wise decision. In practice, however, certain controversial issues at once arose which engendered not a little friction and bitterness between NID(C) and SOE personnel.
It is important to consider here the differences that arose because they not only affected in some measure the course of SOE Maritime Operations in Brittany but point several morals for the future.
The first difficulty was over North Coast operations. NID(C) ruled that the 41’ 6” RAF Seaplane tender “360” was too small and unseaworthy for operations to the North Coast (except perhaps in the finer summer months when her lack of speed and the short period of darkness would in any event preclude her use). SOE operating personnel, who had carried out several operations in midwinter in this boat, resented this ruling and even regarded it with suspicion. They were fully aware, however, of the limitations of speed and carrying capacity of “360” and had been trying for some time, but without success, to obtain two RAF 64ft. Air/Sea Rescue High Speed Launches, which would not only be faster and more seaworthy but would be able to carry a larger quantity of stores and also a rigid boat (instead of Folboat canoes) for landing work.
It must be admitted, nevertheless, that NID(C)’s ruling was based on reasonable grounds. As this department had been made responsible for the operational control of clandestine operations by sea in the English Channel and approaches, it was necessary to ensure that the most suitable material available should be used, rather than run any risk of an area being compromised due to a mishap to a vessel which orthodox Naval Officers would naturally consider too small for the work.
NID(C) agreed, however, to make available their own gunboats, (when not employed on SIS operations), for SOE transport work and, in the early months of 1942, two operations were carried out in one of these gunboats by personnel of the Helford SOE base. It produced, however, an awkward system of divided control – the over-riding conduct of the expedition being the responsibility of the Commanding Officer of the Gunboat, with the SOE Officer’s responsibility being confined to the command of the landing party when ashore. It need hardly be said that SOE Officers, who previously had commanded their own ship on operations, did not take kindly to being relegated to the role of passengers in NID(C) vessels, and though they tried with the best will in the world to accustom themselves to the changed conditions, it was obvious that the SOE purely Naval role had been largely nullified.
The other main point of dissension was NID(C)’s ruling that the SOE fishing vessels were not to be used on West Coast operations as they were of unsuitable type. Here also, there was something to be said for both sides. The Long Liner and Trawler were both North Coast vessels (the only ones available when they were taken over) and although they had been structurally altered and camouflaged to make them as suitable as possible for contact with West Coast vessels, NID(C) maintained, perhaps rightly, that they would not pass muster when seen by Breton West Coast fishermen at close range. In the opinion of certain SOE Officers however, the NID(C) case was spoilt when the genuine West Coast Tunnymen was also condemned as unsuitable for operations, although she had been passed as correct in every detail by a Breton Tunny Fishing Skipper. Subsequently, moreover, it did not escape notice that NID(C) themselves employed later on a specially built high-speed motor vessel on West Coast operations, which was meant to look like a “Pinasse” but which, owing to her excessively wide stern, could not be expected to deceive a Breton fisherman for an instant, except at a considerable distance.
Summer 1942
It was at about this time that Captain HA Simpson RN took over control of the SOE Naval section in London and, to overcome these difficulties, he arranged in due course for the acquisition of 4 new West Coast vessels, approved by NID(C) representatives as being suitable for operations on the West Coast of Brittany. The conversion of the lay-out below decks was arranged to allow for the stowage of 4 tons of stores in special lockers.
The first of these ships was ready by the autumn of 1942 when CD and Captain Simpson visited the Helford Base and discussed future plans with Lt Cdr Holdsworth.
As a result of this visit, and after discussions with the French section, an operation was arranged to take place in the Quiberon Bay area in the new ship.
At the last moment, however, when all details had been worked out, a ban was placed on all SOE operations to the West Coast of France for fear of the possibility of compromising the SIS fishing vessel mail service, which had become increasingly important as a result of the Enemy’s entry into unoccupied France and the consequent tightening up of control on the French Mediterranean seaboard. This ban, which was not lifted until several months after “D” Day, came as a severe disappointment to SOE personnel at Helford.
Autumn and Winter 1942
The period autumn and early winter of 1942 was an important turning point in the history of the Helford Base. In September, the accommodation and facilities of the Base had been augmented by the acquisition of a second house close to the anchorage, and adjoining a good stretch of foreshore on which was situated a boathouse which had been taken over a short time previously.
In October, the planning and intelligence arrangements were expanded in order to enable operations to be planned at short notice without the necessity of a long visit to London. This entailed keeping up-to-date tracings and aerial photographs of the increasing Enemy defences on the Brittany Coast.
In November, the first successful Larder operation, “Carpenter”, was carried out on a beach on the North Coast as little to the Westward of the Ile de Bas. The SOE personnel on this operation were transported in one of NID(C)’s gunboats from Dartmouth. Unfortunately, no arrangements for collection of the buried stores could be made, and six months later they were accidentally discovered by a fisherman who reported his discovery to the Enemy. “Lardering” was introduced with a view to avoiding the difficulties which were so apt to arise when reception committees were involved, but it depended for its success on the reasonably prompt removal of the Stores from their caches. The removal of the stores inland, however, ultimately was rendered extremely difficult owing to the steady increase in the coastal defences and the strict enemy surveillance in the 15 mile coastal strip.
At the beginning of December, Lt Cdr Holdsworth handed over command of the Base to Lt Cdr Warington Smyth and sailed for North Africa (with the majority of the operational personnel of the Base) in two fishing vessels, to set up a new SOE sea transport service in the Western Mediterranean.
Early 1943
In view of the ban on SOE operations by fishing vessel to the West Coast of Brittany, it was decided to do everything possible to step up operations to the North Coast. Conditions, however, had altered appreciably from the earlier days. The enemy defences on the Channel coast has been built up, beaches had been mined and sea patrols organised, so that even if the operational use of the 41’ 6” RAF “360” had still been allowed, it would have been taking an unjustifiable risk to use such a comparatively slow and unarmed ship in close approach to the enemy coast.
It was apparent, however, that the transport service offered by NID(C) with the gunboats of the Dartmouth flotilla was never likely to be entirely satisfactory from the SOE point of view. There were a variety of reasons for this, the main ones being SIS priority in the use of these vessels and the unsuitability of the vessels themselves owing to their low speed. This lack of speed meant that the boats could not be employed at all during the mid summer months owing to the short period of darkness. Yet it was the fine weather of mid summer which was most suitable for the SOE requirement of landing stores in small boats on exposed beaches.
It was therefore decided to follow up Holdsworth’s original idea of obtaining two 64ft. RAF Air/Sea Rescue vessels which would possess the additional margin of speed over the Dartmouth gunboats to enable them to operate in summer. NID(C), who were consulted to ascertain whether they would have any objection to the operational use of such craft, were inclined to turn down the scheme on the grounds that the boats lacked proper Navigational facilities and deck room to carry boats. They also questioned the comparative lack of seaworthiness and armament of an HSL4 as compared with the 110 ft MGBs. It was finally agreed, as a compromise, that one 64 footer should if possible be obtained and trials carried out to ascertain her suitability or otherwise for the projected work.
Meanwhile further Larder operations were being attempted in the Dartmouth gunboats. During every non-moon period for several months an SOE landing party from Helford stood by at Dartmouth for operations, but January, February and March 1943 were stormy months in the Channel, and although several attempts were made they all proved abortive.
Similar expeditions, sailing from Falmouth, were rather more successful. Two reconnaissances were made of Ile Stagadon in the L’Abervrac’h approaches, with a view to enlisting the help of the farmer and his wife – the sole inhabitants of the island – in starting a reception business on a large scale, but owing to fortuitous circumstances this plan came to nought. A successful Larder operation was also completed on Ile Guennoc in the L’Abervrac’h are at the end of March. This proved to be the last Larder operation undertaken. A great deal of careful planning and training had gone into the preparations for this type of operation and its discontinuance was a severe disappointment.
Summer 1943
The early summer of 1943 was noteworthy for a marked change in the status of the so-called “Private Navies”. An Admiralty directive, dated 1st June 1943, decreed that “the responsibility for all clandestine sea operations in all theatres” was vested in the Admiralty; that the flotillas engaged in such operations were under Naval Control; and that the post of Deputy Director of Operations Division (Irregular), (short title DDOD(I)) had been created at the Admiralty for this purpose. In actual practice, the change was principally one of name only, the NID(C) organisation merely changing its name to DDOD(I). The main result, as far as Helford was concerned, was that all operational ships, including the newly acquired 64 ft RAF HSL 119 (on which satisfactory trials had already been carried out) had to be handed over to DDOD(I).
At the same time (i.e. during the non-operational summer months of 1943) two other changes of importance took place at Helford. First, a definite training programme was inaugurated by Rear Admiral AH Taylor (who had succeeded Captain Simpson as head of Naval Section in April) to prepare landing teams to reinforce the crews which were already in the Mediterranean and, later, to go to India and the Far East as a nucleus for SOE operations in those areas. The Officers and men who composed these teams received a two months course of training which included such things as Seamanship in small boats, landing and embarking through surf, field craft, unarmed combat, demolitions, map reading, pistol and Tommy Gun practice etc. These teams subsequently did valuable work overseas, especially in the Mediterranean, and many of the officers and men who composed them received decorations for their work in North Africa, Italy, Corsica, and the Riviera.
The second event of importance at Helford which took place during the early summer of 1943, was the transfer by DDOD(I) of his fishing vessel flotilla from Falmouth to Helford. Originally, this flotilla, consisting of only two ships, had been based at Dartmouth. This port however was found by experience to be inconveniently far to the Eastward, in view of the fact that operational ‘departures’ had to be made from the Scilly Islands, and the vessels were in due course moved to Falmouth. This proved far from satisfactory from the security point of view and difficult as regards administration. FOIC Falmouth, moreover, had little room in the docks to allocate to these vessels and considered it would be more satisfactory if both the “Private Navies” in his sub-command were based together in the Helford River. Accordingly in June 1943, the DDOD(I) ships from Falmouth, augmented by the operational ships taken over from SOE, were combined at Helford under the name of “The Inshore Patrol” Flotilla, with HMY “Sunbeam” (Lt Cdr N Warington Smyth RNVR) as the Flotilla Base Ship.5
This change of Base was of importance in that it opened up a new era in the relations between the SOE personnel at Helford and the Officers and men of DDOD(I)’s fishing vessel flotilla. It enabled everyone to get to know each other, and it came as a source of great surprise to more than one Officer (and to some of the more intelligent Ratings) to discover that – contrary to what they had been educated to believe – the principal enemy was Hitler and not their opposite number in the sister organisation. Nothing but good came of this amalgamation at the same Base, and the personnel of the two Organisations at Helford worked thereafter in the closest co-operation, with the discomfiture of the Hun as their sole objective.
The practical results of this co-operation were exhibited in a number of ways. SIS operations on the mail run to the West Coast of Brittany continued, and the Senior Officer Inshore Patrol (short title SOIP) was able on more than one occasion to make use of last minute intelligence supplied by the SOE “Planning Room”. Ideas were exchanged on the ever recurring problem of landing through surf on exposed beaches in small boats, and combined trials of new surf boats were carried out at Prah Sands.6 Combined sea exercise in Fishing vessels and in HSL 119 were also undertaken. The SOE shore establishment was also used on occasions, both for reasons of security and convenience, to accommodate Agents exfiltrated by SOIP’s fishing vessels from the West Coast of Brittany. This was the state of affairs at the end of the North Coast non-operational period of the summer 1943.
Autumn 1943
Rumours of the expected Allied invasion of the Continent were at this time very much in the air, and it was hoped at Helford that the coming winter operational period would see the demand for considerable quantities of Arms and Stores to be landed in Brittany. Accordingly the Intelligence and Security Officer of the Base visited London to obtain the latest ISTD7 reports and aerial photographs and checked up on all the latest intelligence regarding enemy coastal defences. In the hope that the ban on SOE operations on the West Coast would be lifted as “D” day approached, the tracings and photographs for this coast line were also brought up to date.
As events turned out, the West Coast ban was not lifted until some months after “D” day, and the anticipated demand for supplies and arms for the North Coast never materialised. At the SOE Base at Helford the period passed as one of intense disappointment and frustration, and the difficulty of keeping up morale and keenness of over-trained crews became acute. The Officers felt that a golden opportunity for arming the Breton resistance groups in readiness for “D” Day was being allowed to slip by, and assurance from London that everything possible was being done to mount operations, but that insuperable difficulties were being encountered on the reception side, carried little conviction when DDOD(I)’s gunboats were carrying out one operation after another, landing Agents and stores and exfiltrating agents and a considerable number of RAF and USAAF evaders. It was argued that if it were possible to exfiltrate twenty of more men in one operation from North Coast coves and beaches, it should have been possible to land Stores and arrange for their transport inland and distribution to Resistance groups. The true explanation appears to have been that the SOE Country Section concerned had long grown tired of the difficulties that always seemed to arise when, in the past, they had endeavoured to arrange the landing of stores by sea, and had become almost completely air minded. If SOE had not lost control of its own sea transport service, it is probable that this state of mind would not have arisen.
Another factor which contributed indirectly to this state of affairs, was the lack of sufficient gunboats available to DDOD(I). As it was, the crews and boats of the 15th MGB flotilla were worked extremely hard during this winter of 1943 on SIS and MI98 operations, so that even if a demand from SOE Country Sections had been forthcoming, it would have been extremely difficult – if not impossible – for DDOD(I) to have met it, and his other commitments, with the resource at his disposal.
Winter 1943
The general feeling of gloom and disappointment at Helford was relieved to some extent, however by certain events which took place in the closing months of 1943. At the end of November one of DDOD(I)’s Gunboats sailed from Falmouth to Ile Guennoc (the island at the approaches to L’Abervac’h used by SOE for their operations in the winter of 1941/42) to carry out an operation for SIS and MI9. The object of the expedition was to bring out Agents and mail and also to evacuate some 20 Allied airmen. Unfortunately, bad weather was encountered at the pinpoint while embarkation was taking place, and only one of the three landing boats succeeded in regaining the gunboat. The other two boats were forced to return to Ile Tariec, the crews (which included the 1st Lieutenant and several seamen from the Gunboat), having to go into hiding. RAF “360” met the Gunboat off the Manacles on her return to Falmouth Bay, took off the 7 men who had been evacuated in the first boat, and brought them to Helford where they were accommodated for the night at the SOE shore establishment.
A similar operation was planned for the December non-moon period, when it was hoped it would also prove possible to recover the boat’s crews which had been left behind.
The first attempt was made by MGB 318 (Lt Jan Mason SANF(V)9) a few days before Christmas, but bad weather at the rendezvous was again encountered and after one of the landing boats had had to be cut adrift, fortunately without loss of personnel, the attempt had to be abandoned.
DDOD(I) having stated that the operation was of high priority and that the next attempt must succeed at all costs, a conference, attended by SOE representatives, was held in HMY ”Sunbeam” to discuss details for the next attempt.
As a result of this conference, it was agreed on SOIP suggestion to try using the big 25 ft Surf Boat (SN 2)10 with only one of the 14 ft boats of the type previously used. SN 2 being too big to take on the deck of the gunboat, special strops and warps were prepared to fit her for the long tow of 200 miles. SOIP lent an Officer and two men to augment MGB 318’s crew, and the 25 ft Surf Boat was manned by a picked SOE crew of 6 men in charge of Skipper H Rendle RNR. The operation, Codeword “Felicitate”, was completely successful, and on Christmas Day 1943 a total of 27 persons, Agents, Allied Airmen and the rescued Officer and men of the Gunboat ate their Christmas lunch at the Helford Base.11
It is worth noting here that Modern Navigational aids, e.g. “QH” gear,12 with which the gunboats were fitted, had done much to facilitate accurate landfalls at the pinpoints, and the use of R/T devices, such as “Walkie Talkies” and “S-Phones”,13 between ship, boats and shore, had proved of immense help with the boatwork at the landing points. MGB 318 herself, however, was an old “C” Class Gunboat which has seen much hard service during the earlier years of the war, so that her sustained cruising speed on passage was now no better than 15 or 16 knots (at a liberal estimate – she actually averaged 14 on the “Felicitate” operation). It remained to many Officers and Men, therefore, a matter for considerable astonishment that DDOD(I) should be compelled to use a slow and antiquated “C” class gunboat (presumably through Admiralty inability or reluctance to provide him with a better vessel) on an operation of admittedly high priority in this, the fourth winter of the war. Even allowing for the German superiority in high-speed Diesel marine engineering, the cynical observer was inclined to feel that the disparity in speed between the 35 knot “E” Boats (which were roaming the Channel as far west as the Scillies) and the 16 knot MGB 318 (employed in close approach to enemy territory on operations of high priority) was unduly great.
1944
The early months of 1944 were spent in intensive training, all the resources of SOE Base and DDOD(I)’s flotilla having been combined at the approach of “D” Day. This training ended with a week’s full scale exercises for ships and men, but the expected request for large scale landing of Arms in Brittany never materialised, although the demand undoubtedly existed. In August, however, two ships of the Helford flotilla sailed for the L’Abervac’h, one of them proceeding thence to Ushant to land arms, stores and medical supplies. The other vessel trans shipped her arms and stores to one of DDOD(I)’s Gunboats which took them on to Benodet, fighting a spirited action with a German shore battery at Audierre on their return passage.
Lt Colonel Berthaud, head of the FFI14 in Finistere, to whom the Arms were handed over, said that he was glad to have them as there were still numerous pockets of the enemy to be cleaned up, but at the same time he expressed considerable surprise and regret that the consignment had not been delivered at least two months earlier.
The remaining six months in the life of the Helford Base, that is to say from October 1944 to March 1945, were spent in paying off ships and acting as receiving and dispersal Base for SOE ships and men returning home from the Mediterranean.
The Base finally closed down at the end of March 1945.
Initialled BWS 12/2/46
- Naval Intelligence Department (C)
- Secret Intelligence Service
- Motor Gun Boats
- High speed launch
- This was a smart appointment. Having two brothers – Bevil (SOE) and Nigel (SIS) working alongside each other probably helped to defuse tensions.
- More usually ‘Praa Sands’
- Unknown abbreviation
- Military Intelligence 9 – tasked with assisting evaders and escapers
- South African Naval Force (Volunteer)
- In his book Secret Flotillas Sir Brooks Richards refers to it as SN 2 in one place and SN 6 in another. Lt Cdr Warington Smyth was there at the time and the official papers call it SN 2
- An uncharacteristic mistake by the author. The mission only returned on Boxing Day when a late Christmas Dinner was indeed served
- An early form of Decca navigation
- A personal portable transceiver fitting into a suitcase with a range of about 30 miles
- Free French of the Interior – the Resistance in all but name